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The farmer now has legislative assurance that the generous provisions of Section 117(j) will be applied to two broad classes of farm transactions.
Some of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, some of the Commissioner's Regulations, and some court decisions have, at one time or another,
served to benefit farmers as a taxpaying class. The same or similar Code provisions, Regulations, and court decisions have undoubtedly benefited many
other classes of taxpayers in a like fashion. An appraisal of the economic consequences of this variety of benefits in the tax system would be difficult, if not
impossible; and perhaps the very difficulty of such an appraisal is a forceful
argument against Code provisions, Regulations, and court decisions which accord special treatment to a chosen class of taxpayers.

LIVING EXPENSES WHILE "AWAY FROM
HOME": BUSINESS OR PERSONAL?
Section 23 (a) (i) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code' provides that when an
expenditure is incurred in the pursuit of a business venture, as distinguished
from personal gratification, it is deductible from gross income.2 Before 1921 it
was held by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the courts that although
transportation expenses incurred on business trips were deductible, expenditures made for meals and lodgings during such trips were not. 3 In i92o a regulation of the Bureau made deductible expenses for meals and lodging in excess of
what the taxpayer would ordinarily pay for these personal needs when at his
established residence.4 In 1921 an amendment to a statute comparable to
Section 23 (a) (i) (A) explicitly provided for the deduction of meals and lodging
expenses by enlarging the business expense category so as to encompass all
"traveling expenses (including the entire amount expended for meals and lodgused in the trade or business,' in computing net income no deduction... attributable to the
production of such crop shall be allowed." For a survey of the problems which may arise
under §§ 117(J)(3) and 24(f), see Halstead, Capital Gains of Farmers, 25 So. Calif. L. Rev.
36, 47 et seq. (ig5i).
S26 U.S.C.A. § 23 (a)(i)(A) (1948).

'The section provides that in computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
"All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business.. . ." Ibid. In contrast, Section 24 (a)(1) states that no deduction
shall be allowed for "[p]ersonal, living or family expenses .... " Int. Rev. Code § 24 (a)(i),
26

U.S.C.A. § 24 (a)(i) (1948).
3 Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 392 (1920).
4T.D. No. 3101, 3 Cum. Bull. i9

(1920)

(1920). This ruling amended Treas. Reg. 45, Art. 293
which had stated that expenses for meals and lodging on business trips were not fully

deductible. Accord: io B.T.A. 386, 389 (1928); Mim. 2688, 4 Cum. Bull. 209 (1921). A person
claiming a traveling expense deduction was required to attach to his return a statement setting

forth the cost of personal expenses had he lived at his residence. All business traveling expenses
in excess of that amount were deductible.
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ing) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business."s Legislative
history indicates that this wording was added to allow greater deductions for
traveling salesmen because "it was thought that their traveling expenses were a
matter of proper deduction and that their meals and lodging should be included
in such deductions." 6 In the debates concerning this amendment some legislators expressed a fear that deductions would be allowed in situations not contemplated by the authors. 7 This Congressional concern seems now to have been
justified, for the courts and the Bureau have experienced considerable difficulty
in construing the amendment.
Early in the course of tax litigation, trouble arose in applying the "away
from home" criterion to the common situation in which a taxpayer maintained
his residence in one locality but had his place of employment or business in another vicinity. In light of the underlying rationale of Section 23 (a)(i)(A), it
seemed that Congress did not intend to allow as a business expense deduction
expenditures incurred by reason of a taxpayer's personal preferences for living
away from his place of business.' Since daily commuting expenses had always
been disallowed,9 it was said to be manifestly discriminatory to allow comparable deductions to a man who chose to maintain his residence beyond daily
commuting distance from his place of business."° To avoid the consequences of a
literal interpretation, some courts held a taxpayer to be "away from home"
within the meaning of the amendment "only while... away from his place of
business, employment, or post or station at which he is employed."'z While this
interpretation resulted in denying traveling expense deductions to a taxpayer
s The amendment was added to Section 214 (a)(i) of the 1921 Act. See Seidman, Legislative History of Federal Income Tax Laws 822 (1938).
661 Cong. Rec. 6673 (1921). To the same effect are speeches in 6i Cong. Rec. 5201 (1921).
7Senators displayed concern that the entire living expenses of Congressmen in Washington,
D.C. would be deductible. 6i Cong. Rec. 6673 (1921). This angered some, and Mr. Williams
of Arizona retorted: "I will undertake now to say that no full-blooded American in any department, even though he calls himself an expert, will ever issue a departmental decision that
my duties as a Senator constitute a trade, and that the public business to which I pay my
attention in my inefficient way is my private business." Ibid. But Mr. Watson of Indiana
answered that concerning the transaction of the business in which Congressmen were concerned, Washington was their "home," in the pursuit of that business. Ibid.

8 The authorities are reviewed in Barnhili v. Comm'r, 148 F. 2d 9 13 (C.A. 4 th, i945). In
Laubscher v. Comm'r, 3 T.C.M. 1025, 1028 (i944), the court remarked: "If 'home' as used in
the statute were construed as equivalent to 'domicile' a large part of the population of the
District of Columbia, and perhaps of New York City, would be in a position to contend that
their expenses of living should be deducted from income subject to tax by virtue of Section
23 (a), since their formal domiciles are in states other than the state or districtin which their
place of business or employment is."
9I.T. 1184,
(1942).

1922-I

Cum. Bull.

121;

4 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 25.83

10 Barnhill v. Comm'r, 148 F. 2d 913, 917 (C.A. 4 th, I945).
1, Bixler v. Comm'r, 5 B.T.A. 1i8i, 1184 (1927). Accord: Tracy v. Comm'r, 39 B.T.A.
578 (1930); Lindsay v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936); Peters v. Comm'r, i B.T.A. 9oi
(1qo).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 19

who maintained a residence away from his sole place of business, it created
some conceptual problems when applied to slightly variant facts. A traveling
salesman whose business traveled with him could never be "away from home"
under this definition unless some particular place, such as his residence, if he
maintained one, or his employer's main office, were to be considered his "place
of business" and consequently his "home." Similarly, since he was always at a
place of business and therefore never "away from home," a taxpayer who had
two places of business and traveled between them could not receive a deduction
unless further criteria were established to determine which place of business
was his "home" for purposes of the amendment.
I
Interpreting "home" to mean "place of business" did not explain why
traveling expenses were not allowed as deductions in cases where the taxpayer's
sole place of business was away from his residence. It stated a conclusion which
the courts might have reached without changing the usual meaning of "home."
This was pointedly illustrated by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v.
Flowers2 when, in 1946, it considered the traveling expense amendment for the
first time. The Court affirmed the Tax Court's decision that an employee's desire to maintain a residence in Jackson, Mississippi, when his entire work could
have been performed in Mobile, Alabama, was unnecessary to the conduct of
the employer's business in Mobile. Writing for the majority, Justice Murphy
enunciated three conditions to be met before traveling expenses could be deducted. The expense must be (i) reasonable and necessary, (2) incurred while
away from home and (3) incurred in the pursuit of a trade or business, which
meant in direct connection with, and essential to, the development and pursuit
of the business or trade.3 Finding that personal convenience motivated Mr.
Flowers to keep his place of business more than a commuting distance from
his residence, the Court held that failure to satisfy the third of the three conditions justified denial of the traveling expense deduction which he sought.
Although noting the conflict in the courts over a proper meaning for "home,"
the Supreme Court stated that it was not necessary to define that term in the
Flowers type of situation." The Court indicated that whether the taxpayer is
"away from home" is irrelevant until a preliminary test-whether the particular expense is required by the inherent nature of the business-has been
12 326 U.S. 465 (1945) , rev'g 148 F. 2d 163 (C.A. 5th, 1945).
"3Ibid., at 470.
14 bid., at 472. The Courts of Appeal had split on a proper interpretation. The Fifth Circuit, which had held for the taxpayer in the Flowers case, Flowers v. Comm'r, 148 F. 2d x63
(C.A. 5th, 1945), and the Ninth Circuit, in Wallace v. Comm'r, I44 F. 2d 4 07 (C.A. 9th, 1944),
thought that the word "home" was to be understood and applied in its ordinary sense and that
the Tax Court had invaded the domain of Congress in construing "home" in some other
manner. The Fourth Circuit, in Barnhill v. Comm'r, 148 F. 2d 913 (C.A. 4 th, i945), sided
with the Tax Court in interpreting "home" as "place of business."
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met.' Implicit in this test and in the Court's contrast of "business expenses"
with "personal expenses" is the crucial question whether, for business reasons
alone, the taxpayer has been required to expend amounts over and above what
he would ordinarily spend to satisfy his personal needs.,6
Commenting on the Flowers case, some writers thought that the proponents
of "the view that home means place of business had won their point, indirectly if
not directly."' 7 Further reflections on other factual circumstances will, however,
demonstrate that this is not necessarily true.
Prior to the Flowers case it had been agreed that a taxpayer who temporarily
left his residence in pursuit of his sole business could take a deduction for
traveling expenses incurred on his temporary trip. It was conceptually simple to
allow deductions where the taxpayer's business had a single location near his
place of residence.' 8 Since the same result would follow whether "home" was
given its popular meaning or interpreted to mean "place of business," it did not
matter what definition was given to "home." As indicated above, the situation
where the taxpayer's business had no definite location presented greater difficulty, however.'9 In such a case, decisions before the Flowerscase either rejected
"place of business" as a synonym for "home" or formulated another definition
of "home," such as "the place where he [taxpayer] is regularly employed or
customarily carries on business during the taxable year."z °
Decisions subsequent to the Flowerscase have continued to allow deductions
where the taxpayer takes his place of business with him.2" The Tax Court has

said that temporary changes of the place of business may lead to "unavoidable,
reasonable, and necessary expenses while away from his 'home' in the pursuit of
[a] trade."' 2 Implicit in such reasoning is the notion that "home" under the
2

1sComm'r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473 (I945). Accord: Albert v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 129
(1949); Warren v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 205 (1949); Bercaw v. Comm'r, i6S F. 2d 521 (C.A.
4th, 1948); Carranza v. Comm'r, ii T.C. 224 (1948); Brooks v. Comm'r, 7 T.C.M. 635
(1948).
6
See Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 35 (1947).
17 Deduction of Traveling Expenses, 32 Cornell L..
451, 455 (1947). Dissenting in the
Flowers case, Justice Rutledge stated that the majority opinion in effect held that "home"
means "place of business." 326 U.S. 465, 479 (1945).
18E.g., Penn v. Robertson, 29 F. Supp. 386 (M.D. N.C., 1939) (traveling expenses of corporate director); Potter v. Comm'r, 18 B.T.A. 549 (1929).
'9

Text following note ii supra.

2°Coburn v. Comm'r, 138 F.

2d 763, 764 (C.A. 2d, 1943) (Hollywood living expenses of
actor, whose residence and theatrical employment were in New York, incurred while acting in
a motion picture for 263 days in 1938). Accord: Schurer v. Comm'r, 3 T.C. 544, 546 (1946)(A).
(In allowing deduction of the living expenses of a journeyman plumber while away from his
residence, the Tax Court disregarded its previous interpretation of "home" as place of business
and asserted that each "case... must be decided upon its own facts.")
21It is obvious that temporary business trips by the taxpayer whose stationary business
is located at his residence remain unaffected by the Flowers case if the trip is required by the
needs of the business.
"Leach v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 20, 21 (1949) (taxpayer was required to be away from his
residence for 49 weeks during the tax year in connection with his work for a construction
company).
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Flowers case need not mean "place of business." Many decisions in this area
have hinged upon a factual determination as to whether a particular business
trip was for an indefinite time as distinguished from a temporary period. The
cases are agreed in theory that if the trip is for a temporary period, the taxpayer
is entitled to a traveling expense deduction because, it is said, he cannot be expected to uproot an established residence for a temporary absence. 23 Hard and
perhaps somewhat arbitrary factual distinctions have resulted in a denial of
traveling expense deductions when the court decided that the business trip was
of an indefinite nature, for, then, maintenance of a residence away from the
new business location was thought to be for the taxpayer's own convenience, 24
as in the Flowerscase.
II

Closely akin to the "temporary-absence" situations are cases in which a
traveling salesman seeks a deduction for his living expenses while traveling.
Early decisions under the amended section allowed a traveling salesman to
deduct his traveling expenses, including meals and lodging while away from an
established residence.25 One case reached a contrary result for a salesman who
had no' established residence. In Duncan v. Commissioner6 the taxpayer, a
traveling salesman, worked on a commission basis paying all his transportation and living expenses. He lived in different cities which he made his headquarters for the time; but he claimed as his residence a certain hotel to which
his wife, who lived at a hotel in another state because of ill health, sometimes
came (when he was there). The Board of Tax Appeals disallowed his deduction
of expenditures for meals, lodging and laundry while away from his alleged
residence. Stating that the taxpayer had not shown that these expenses were
"in excess of those ordinarily required when not engaged in such business,"27 the
court could find no Congressional intent to "allow as deductions, all the year's
expenses for meals, lodging.., incurred by a taxpayer who traveled on a
Mahoney v. Comm'r, 4 T.C.M. 395 (i945); Shelley v. Comm'r, 4 T.C.M. 668 (i945).
24NWaugh v. Comm'r, 9 T.C.M. 600 (rg5o); Pennington v. Comm'r, 9 T.C.M. 955 (195o).
Many cases have involved claims for deductions of living expenses incurred while the taxpayer was employed by the government or by private war plants away from his residence for
the duration of World War II. In each case the courts held this employment to be of an indefinite nature. E.g., Andrews v. Comm'r, 179 F. 2d 502 (C.A. 4 th, ig5o); Warren v. Comm'r,
13 T.C. 205 (1949); Locke v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. 1002 (1949); Johnson v. Comm'r, 8 T.C. 303
(1947).
With Leach v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 20 (1949) (note 22 supra), compare Jones v. Comm'r, 13
T.C. 880 (1949). In the Jones case the taxpayer left his residence when sent by his employer,
a construction company, to work on the atomic energy project at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. He
worked there for 357 days of 1945 and returned home in 1946. Two judges vigorously dissented
from the majority's view that the Oak Ridge construction work was of an indefinite duration.
For further "hard" cases: Tyler v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 186 (1949); Bryson v. Comm'r, 7 T.C.M.
77 (1948); Bark v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 85i (z946).
2sAppeal of Burgio, 4 B.T.A. 4 (1926); Appeal of Sonenblick, 4 B.T.A. 986 (1926).
26 17 B.T.A. lo88 (1929), aff'd without opinion, 47 F. 2d lO82 (C.A. 2d, 1931).
27Ibid., at 2O92.
23
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roving commission, with headquarters wherever he happened to be.' ' 2s At
first glance Mr. Duncan's living expenses would seem to have been deductible under the "pursuit of business" test later posited in the Flowers case,
for his trips, unlike those of Mr. Flowers, were required by the nature of his
business. Since Mr. Duncan had no living expenses at "home," however,
it might properly be said that he had no additional expenses (aside from
transportation costs) attributable to the nature of his business, despite the
fact that his occupation required traveling. Apparently the Duncan court
felt that a rule denying all deductions for living expenses was necessary to
place persons without a permanent place of abode on a par with persons who
maintain such a residence, the expense of which is considered personal and
therefore non-deductible29
Subsequently, however, the Tax Court became more liberal in its treatment
of the living expenses of a traveling salesman without an established residence.
In two cases the Tax Court granted such salesmen a living expense deduction
on the theory that "home" was his employer's place of business.3O Similarly,
in Gustafson v. ConnnissionerS' an unmarried traveling salesman was permitted
to deduct all his traveling expenditures for food and lodging upon the ground
that he had a permanent "home" at his sister's residence in Greenville, Iowa,
some miles from his employer's "home office" in Des Moines. Mr. Gustafson
traveled all year round, returning to his sister's residence (where he paid nothing)
for only two weekends out of the entire tax year. Despite the fact that the taxpayer had no additional "home" expenses, the Tax Court granted a full deduction because the statute gave no ground "for substituting a hypothetical
home living expense as a non-deductible amount and limiting the deduction to
the artificial excess,"32 but, rather, "[t]he statute expressly provides for the deduction among traveling expenses of the entire amount expended for meals and
lodging and no part of such entire amount may be treated as living expenses,
even though ... no actual home living expenses be included in the deduction."13
Clearly the Gustafson case counters most of the implications of the Duncan
8
2 Ibid., at iogi. The Duncan decision was often cited as the leading case concerning the
traveling expenses of a taxpayer who had his home "in his hat" and had no permanent place
of abode. It was said that such a taxpayer could receive no deduction for living expenses incurred on his trips since "he was never away from home because his home was wherever he
might be." 4 Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 25.82 at 476 (1942).
29 Note 2 supra.
30 Murphy v. Comm'r, i T.C.M. 757 (i943); Smith v. Comm'r, 2T.C.M. 837 (1943).
3 3 T.C. 998 (i944)Ibid., at iooo.
33Ibid. Consult Murphy v. Comm'r, i T.C.M. 757 (1943). Here the taxpayer incurred
traveling expenses of $i,o8o during the tax year. He assumed that if he resided in one location
his living expenses would not have been in excess of $6oo a year, and accordingly he sought a
deduction of $48o. Since the court had stated that the taxpayer's "home" was the city where
his employer lived, presumably he could have had a deduction for the ful $i,o8o had he
claimed this amount.
32
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decision. The cases are undoubtedly distinguishable on the narrow ground that
the Tax Court was able to find a "home" for Mr. Gustafson, something it was
unable to find for Mr. Duncan. But the concept of "home" in the Gustafson
case is all-embracing-it may mean simply the place where the taxpayer leaves
some of his luggage, where he votes or pays taxes, where his employer's business
is located, or a combination of these. Probably most traveling salesmen, including Mr. Duncan, could satisfy the "home" requirement if the test is thus
formulated. But defining the word "home" throws little light on the rationale
for allowing or disallowing a deduction.
Hence, the underlying conflict between these two decisions is not in their
definitions of "home" but rather in the treatment each affords to expenses obviously personal in nature but larger than usual, not through personal choice but
directly as a result of business necessity. The Duncan court seems to have
thought that whatever additional expense in meals and lodging was caused by
the transient nature of the taxpayer's business was not sufficient to justify
the discrimination between taxpayers which would have resulted if Mr. Duncan
has been allowed to deduct all of his living expenses. By the time the Gustafson
case was decided, the Tax Court apparently had become convinced that Congress thought the increased expenses for meals and lodging when traveling continuously in strange localities justified such discrimination. The obvious administrative difficulties entailed in apportioning the cost of a single item (e.g., a
meal in a railroad diner) between its business and personal aspects may have
influenced both courts in their adoption of an "all-or-nothing" rule.
Aside from their different definitions of "home," there is much to say for
both decisions as a matter of statutory interpretation. The Gustafson case
adopts a more literal construction of the "traveling expense" amendment,
treating it as a specific exception to the broad language of Section 24 (a)34 and
allowing a full deduction wherever the living expense while traveling on a trip
can be shown to have been incurred in pursuit of business. It is possible that
Congress, too, was impressed with the administrative difficulties in a grant of
only partial deductibility.
The Duncan decision treats the amendment as logically harmonious with
both the reasonable and necessary business expense deduction and the nondeductibility of personal expenses and, therefore, applicable only where
business necessity requires the taxpayer to duplicate his personal expenses. A
logical extension of the Duncanreasoning from the "no single residence" to the
"temporary absence" situations, however, would result in complete deductibility of lodging expenditures but non-deductibility of meals expenditures
which are rarely duplicated (although possibly increased) by the necessity of
traveling. Clearly the language of the amendment purports to allow some de34 "In computing net income no deduction shall in any case be allowed in respect of(i) Personal, living, or family expenses... ." Int. Rev. Code § 24 (a) (1948), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 24 (a) (1948).

1952]

COMMENTS

duction for meals; and both legislative history and administrative practice indicate that the prior law, which allowed only a partial deduction, was thought
to have been changed in favor of full deductibility in the "temporary absence" situations.3s
As a matter of statutory interpretation, however, it does not follow from the
inapplicability of the Duncan rationale to "temporary absence" situations that
the court in that case reached an incorrect result in the "no single residence"
situation. According to the Senate Report on the "traveling expense" amendment there was no intent to alter the prior law except to allow full deductibility
where only partial deductibility could be had before. 36 Since a traveling salesman without living expenses at a place of residence could deduct no part of
his living expenses incurred on business trips before the 1921 amendment,37 there
is reason to believe that the amendment was not intended to affect such salesmen. This interpretation is borne out by a ruling of the Bureau immediately
after the amendment35 and by a recent case in which living expense deductions
of a theatrical manager who traveled between theatres and had no established
residence were completely disallowed.39
Although the legislature may ultimately find it necessary to resolve the
mixed conflict of policy and statutory interpretation which underlies the
Duncan and Gustafson rulings, it is probable that the results in "no single
residence" cases will continue for some time to hinge upon the definition of
"home." According to the Duncan case, "home" is an established permanent
residence where the taxpayer is incurring some costs, while in Gustafson the
residence need not be established, it apparently being sufficient if the taxpayer
has some particular locale where he would live if he were not traveling.
A court's choice in interpreting the amendment may depend in turn on
3s Note 37 infra.
36 The Report of the Senate Finance Committee, Sen. Rep. No. 275, 67th Cong. ist Sess.
14 (1921), had this to say: "Section 214 [now Section 23 (a)(i)] allows substantially the same

deductions... as are authorized under existing law, but adds the following provisions: (i)
The deduction.., is extended to include all traveling expenses incurred while away from home
in the pursuit of a trade or business...."
37 O.D. 905, 4 CuM. Bull. 212 (1921).
38 The Bureau asserted: "It has been held that a taxpayer for purpose of this deduction
may have no home.... If a single traveling salesman maintains a house or other living quarters to which he may at any time return or which is at all times available for his use, he has a
home within the meaning of the Act.... If, on the other hand, he does not have a home as
above defined, such amounts are not deductible." I.T. 1490, 1922-2 CuM. Bull. 89.
39 Mitnick v. Comm'r, 13 T.C. 1, 4 (1949). The court stated: "Hence the evidence is not

sufficient to justify any of petitioner's expenditures involved as traveling expenses while away
from home in pursuit of a trade or business; his home being, so far as the record shows, wherever
a particular show managed to be. The traveling expenses, therefore, were personal and not
deductible. Section 24 (a), I.R.C." And see Martin v. Comm'r, 44 B.T.A. 185 (1941) (it was
stipulated that the taxpayer maintained no residence in the United States; living expense
deductions were denied). Diamond v. Comm'r, 7 T.C.M. 774 (948) (taxpayer, a carpenter
by trade, maintained no fixed place of abode during the tax year; expenses for meals and
lodging were held to be personal in nature).
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whether it feels that greater equity among taxpayers is achieved by allowing a
deduction of personal expenses because they have been increased by business
necessity or disallowing a deduction of business expenses which are intermingled with personal expenditures.40
Inl
Another traveling expense situation in which the interpretation given
"home" has been at least superficially decisive involves the taxpayer with more
than one permanent business situs who maintains his residence at the location
of one of them. Prior to the Flowers case, the Board of Tax Appeals allowed
deductions for all traveling expenses incurred in connection with the business
located away from the residence of the taxpayer. 4' In the only cases which considered this problem the taxpayer spent a nearly equal amount of time at each
of the two plices of business,4 2 and a ruling of the Bureau indicates that the
Flowers decision is not considered to have altered the permissibility of deductions for living expenses at the business away from the residence in such cases. 43
The influence of the Flowers case on the "two business" situation in which the
taxpayer does not spend a substantially equal amount of time at each business location has not, however, been definitely established. In O'Harav. Commissioner,44 the taxpayer was not permitted to deduct as traveling expenses
40 One explanation for the paucity of "traveling salesman" cases is the fact that formerly
an employee-salesman who was reimbursed for his expenses by his employer was not required
to report such reimbursements as income. Darling v. Comm'r, 4 B.T.A. 499 (1926); 1942-2
Cum. Bull. 153. A 1945 regulation now requires an employee to report as income traveling
expense reimbursements and to deduct only substantiated traveling expenses, Treas. Reg. 1i1,
§ 29.23 (a)(2) (ig5o); but there is apparently no general enforcement of this requirement.
Under the old system it was (and is) difficult for the Bureau to detect expenditures not actually incurred in proper business pursuits, for this information could be gleaned only from a
thorough investigation of the employer's books. See generally Carder, The Salesman's Travel
Expense Deduction, 28 Taxes r48, i5o (i95o).
41Brown v. Comm'r, 13 B.T.A. 832 (1928) (taxpayer, a lawyer, spent half of every month
in Washington, D.C., as chairman of a Congressional committee, and remainder of the time at
his private practice in Toledo, Ohio; deductions allowed for Washington living expenses);
Powell v. Comm'r, 34 B.T.A. 655 (1936), aff'd 94 F. 2d 483 (C.A. ist, 1938) (taxpayer, who had
his residence and business in Boston, spent three days of each week in New York City where
he managed two corporations; deductions allowed for traveling expenses including lodging
and meals while in New York). Cf. G.C.M. 23672, z943 Cum. Bull. 66 (dollar-a-year man was
said to be entitled to deductions while living in Washington, D.C., when he had not severed
his connection with the private organization where he was regularly employed).

42Ibid.
43 I.T. 3842, 1947 Cum. Bull. ii. See Johnson v. Comm'r, CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 18,770, 17
T.C. No. 152 (1952). The Johnson decision illustrates the applicability of the Flowers rule in
conjunction with the doctrine allowing deductions in the "two business" situation where the
taxpayer has spent nearly an equal amount of time at both places. The taxpayer's family residence was in Statesville, Tennessee, and his employers' home office was in Memphis. The employee taxpayer spent So% of his working time in Memphis, and 5o% of the time during the
tax year he worked at places away from Memphis but not in Statesville. The Tax Court
thought that the taxpayer's "home" for purposes of the amendment was in Memphis, and
therefore the taxpayer was allowed to deduct living expenses only for the time spent at a business away from Memphis.
44 6 T.C. 84 r (1946).
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certain expenditures for meals and lodging in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, where
she performed duties as a state official in i94o and 1941, though she maintained a residence in Wilkes-Barre where she returned on weekends to care for
her law business. The Tax Court thought that the taxpayer's "principal place
of business," her "home," was in Harrisburg, so that her expenses while living
there were not deductible.4S
Similarly in Ney v. United States,46 a Court of Appeals stated that the living
expenses of a resident of Fort Smith, Arkansas, incurred in Atlanta, Georgia,
and Washington, D.C., as a result of his being employed by the Office of Price
Administration, were not deductible, although he accepted employment only
for the duration of World War II on the understanding that he would be free
to confer with his associates about his private business and to visit his family
and business in Fort Smith whenever necessary. He visited Fort Smith three to
four days during every six to eight week interval. Although his private business
drew him twice as much salary as his government position, the court denied him
47
deductions for his living expenses while in Atlanta and Washington.
Although the O'Haraand Ney decisions are subject to different interpretations,48 the Bureau has apparently viewed them as establishing a rule that expenses incurred while the taxpayer is at his "principal" place of business are not
deductible, while expenses connected with supervising the "minor" place of
4s The majority opinion also stressed the fact that the taxpayer was not really engaged in
"active pursuit" of her law practice in Wilkes-Barre. The court remarked: "It seems to us that
the petitioner's main interest in Wilkes-Barre during the taxable year was to continue old
contacts and cultivate new ones for future use in the event she should decide to return to that
city .... " O'Hara v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 84r, 844 (1946). So reasoned, the taxpayer had in reality
only one place of business, that at Harrisburg, and her "home" f6r purposes of the amendment would be located there. Other decisions have stressed this point in denying deductions.
E.g., Green v. Comm'r, 12 T.C. 656 ('949); Nadeua v. Comm'r, 8 T.C.M. 658 (1949); Thompson v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 285 (1946).
Writing for five concurring judges in the O'Hara case, Judge Hill stated: "I...
think that
the conclusion herein should not be made dependent in part or at all on the location of petitioner's 'home.'... Making one's self available for work in the place where it is normally conducted on a permanent basis is the personal problem of the worker, and expenses to accomplish that purpose are not made in the pursuit of business within section 23 (a)(x)(A). Until
that is done, the worker has not reported for duty and is pursuing the place of business rather than the business." 0 Hara v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 841, 846-47 (1946). Evidently Judge Hill
would also have denied deductions for living expenses of the taxpayer at Wilkes-Barre if she
had sought to deduct them. This issue was not raised in the case; but under the "principal
business" rationale of the majority, the taxpayer would seemingly have received a deduction
for living expenses at Wilkes-Barre, since that was the business away from the taxpayer's
"home."
Four dissenting judges agreed that the taxpayer should be allowed deductions for living
expenses in Harrisburg because she continued to pay rent for her residence in Wilkes-Barre.
Her position as a state official was said to be a "temporary occupation" while her legal practice "required her to continue to reside in Wilkes-Barre." Ibid., at 85o.
46 77 F. Supp. 1oo5 (W.D. Ark., 1948), aff'd 171 F. 2d 449 (C.A. 8th, 1948), cert. denied
336 U.S. 967 (1948).
47 The taxpayer, however, was allowed a deduction for transportation costs between Washington and Fort Smith.
4 SSee note 45 supra.
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business are deductible.49 The criteria for determining which place of business is
"principal" are manifold, one of the most important being the time element. s
The distinction between "principal" and "minor" place of business is more
in accord with the Flowers decision than would be a rule permitting the taxpayer to deduct the expenses of living at any business away from his residence.
Decisive in the Flowerscase was the fact that personal convenience rather than
business necessity motivated the taxpayer to established his residence at a
point distant from his place of business. To allow a taxpayer who spends but two
months out of the year at an established residence where he also maintains a
business to deduct living expenses for the ten months spent at another place of
business would seemingly discriminate against Mr. Flowers. The taxpayer's
refusal to establish a residence at a place where he lives ten months out of the
year seems clearly motivated by personal convenience, not business necessity.
But as was the case when "place of business" was first used by the courts as a
synonym for "home," the "principal place of business" idea merely states a
conclusion which does not articulate the major premises for allowing or disallowing the deductions. As in the "temporary absence" situations, it would
seem simpler and wiser to employ the Flowers test of business necessity in
applying Section 23 (a) (i) (A) to the "two business" situation, rather than to
distort the word "home" beyond popular recognition.
Should the taxpayer in the "two business" example contendthat if not allowed
deduction for living expenses at the place of business where he spends ten
months, he should be permitted to deduct the expenses of living at his two
months business, the tax result may vary with the location of his established
residence. In Sherman v. Commissioner,"1where the taxpayer's residence was at
49 I.T. 3842, 1947 Cum. Bull. ii.
so Ibid.
s' CCH Tax Ct. Rep. i8,jig, x6 T.C. No. 42 (ig5i). The taxpayer, who resided with his
family in a house owned by him in Worcester, Massachusetts, was employed as production
manager and purchasing agent for a factory located near Worcester. He opened a part-time
sales business in New York in 1945 and during that year spent more time in Worcester (216
days) than in New York (1o2 days), but the profits realized from the New York venture
($8,340.94) exceeded his Worcester salary ($4,066.40). The court distinguished the O'Hara
decision on the ground that in the latter case the taxpayer carried on an inconsequential
degree of activity at one place of business. Mr. Sherman was held to have had his "principal
place of business and home" in Worcester, and the fact that his Worcester earnings turned
out to be less than his New York profits was held not sufficient reason to shift his "home" from
Worcester to New York.
Four of the dissenting judges stated that the Flowers case had prescribed a concept of
"business home" and went on to say: "In the instant case, the petitioner set up a business at
a considerable distance from his home. This is the same situation as in the Flowers case and it
is unaffected ... by the fact that he also had a business (not his principal business so far as
income is concerned) at his actual home." Ibid., at s8,I2o, 44.
Besides the time element, the Sherman decision indicates that several factors may be important in determining whether a taxpayer is justified in keeping his residence away from a
particular place of business. Among these are: the income earned at each place of business,
whether the shift to a new business location is temporary or permanent, and whether the
taxpayer has an established family residence at one place of business.
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his "principal" place of business, the Tax Court allowed a deduction of his
living expenses while at the "minor" place of business. Although there are no
adjudications on the point, a contrary result might obtain where the taxpayer's
only established residence is at his "minor" place of business. If the rationale of
the Duncan case is extended to this situation, no deduction will be allowed, for
there will be no duplication of living expenses while the taxpayer is at his
"minor" place of business unless he also maintains a year-round residence at
the "principal" place of business. An analogy to the Gustafson case, however,
would probably result in a deduction of living expenses at the "minor" business
even if there is no actual duplication of expenses, because the Commissioner has
established a "home" for the taxpayer at his "principal" place of business. Thus
far the Bureau has committed itself in this situation only to allow deductions of
transportation expenses to and from the taxpayer's residence if incurred in
pursuit of the "minor" business S Finally, when the taxpayer has no established
residence, the Duncan-Gustafson conflict of the "no single residence" cases
will be likely to arise.53
As in the "temporary absence" and "no single residence" situations, there
is no reason why "home" need be given a distorted definition in cases where the
taxpayer has two places of business. To determine whether business necessity or
personal convenience has motivated a taxpayer in locating his established
residence ("home" in the popular sense), the same criteria which distinguish a
"principal" from a "minor" place of business must be looked to. But to allow
or deny traveling expense deductions, it is not necessary to create a fiction that
the taxpayer's "home" is at his principal place of business; for if he has failed
to locate his residence near the business requiring the majority of his time and
attention, then his choice is motivated by personal convenience, not business
necessity, and his expenses would not be deductible under the Flowers rule.
2

IV
An "all or nothing" interpretation of the traveling expense deduction makes
for inconsistencies in the tax structure and inequities among taxpayers. When a
taxpayer is required to travel in the pursuit of a business, the costs of transportation are directly attributable to the business and fall within the general
scope of Section 23 (a)(i)(A). Lodging and meals, on the other hand, are personal in nature and therefore under the general rule of Section 24 (a)(i) should
not be deductible unless the taxpayer is required by business necessity to increase or duplicate these expenses. Business trips will ordinarily require the
taxpayer with an established residence to duplicate his lodging, and a full des'I.T. 3842, 1947 Cum.Bull. zx. Cf. Hicks v. Comm'r, 9 T.C.M. 1o88, io9o (195o), where
the Tax Court stated: "Upon a showing that travel... was for a business purpose, we believe
expenses incurred on those occasions should be treated no differently than travel to other cities
away from his principal place of business, although it was his home." It is not certain whether
deductions for living expenses at the minor place of business and residence, as well as transportation costs, were being sought by the taxpayer.
s3See text following note 33 supra.
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duction for these expenditures seems justified. The expense of meals, however, is
rarely duplicated, and consistency at least would seem to justify deduction
only of the increment of expense over and above what the taxpayer would
oidinarily pay for meals at his established residence. When the traveling taxpayer has no permanent residence, his deductions, if any, for both lodgings and
meals should be limited to amounts in excess of what he would hypothetically
pay at a permanent residence. The administrative difficulties of determining this
increment hardly justify the discriminatory effect of a full deduction of living
expenses in any of these situations. It is submitted that a sounder legislative solution would be to allow deduction of an arbitrary percentage of living
expenses incurred while traveling on business.s4

ESTOPPEL, THIRD PARTY PRACTICE, AND
INSURER'S DEFENSES
Liability insurance contracts commonly contain a provision obligating the
insurer to "defend in the name and on behalf of the assured any claim or suit,
whether groundless or not, covered by this policy and brought against the assured.", Valuable to the insurer as a protection against an indifferent defense
or even a failure to defend on the part of the assured, this "defense" clause also
benefits the assured by providing him with expert counsel. Difficulties arise
when an injured party brings an action against the assured and subsequent investigation by the insurer reveals a breach of condition or an essential fact tendS4The drafters of the American Law Institute Tax statute apparently did not deem this
matter sufficiently important to merit statutory modification. The pertinent section of the
proposed statute provides: "Expenses of travel, including the entire cost of meals and lodging,
in carrying on any gainful activity shall not be treated as personal, family, or living expenses.
The term travel as used herein does not include ordinary transit of the taxpayer between his
place of abode, permanent or temporary, and his nearest regular place of business." Federal
Income Tax Statute § rr (a)(i)(B)(ii) (tent. draft, ig5i). The drafters give the following
explanation for the proposed change: "As to expenses of travel the terms 'avay' and 'home'
in section 23 (a)(i) (A) have been highly troublesome and are eliminated in this provision.
The Bureau has taken the attitude that a taxpayer is not 'away' unless he stays at least
overnight. This view was rejected by the Tax Court in Kenneth v. Waters, 12 T.C. 414 (r949),
and no such requirement is adopted in this draft. Cases concerning the meaning of 'home' tend
to make it mean 'principal place of business.' The suggested wording drops the term 'home'
and adheres to the essential principle that an expense of travel, in order to be deductible,
must be incurred in the pursuit of business.... In addition, the last sentence of subparagraph
(ii), somewhat liberalizing present rules, specifically covers the troublesome situation where a
taxpayer has more than one place of business. The decision of the majority of the Tax Court
in Joseph H. Sherman... is substantially in harmony with the proposed provision, although
some suggestions of the case as to the characterization of 'home' are divergent." Ibid., at 208.
The Model Code would evidently allow the taxpayer who spends ten months at a city in the
pursuit of a business to deduct all his living expenses while living there even if he only spends
two months at another place of business where he has an established residence. This result
follows because the living expenses in New York are incurred "in carrying on... gainful
activity."
I See, e.g., Qebme v. Johnson, x8i Minn. 138, 140, 231 N.W. 817 (1930).

